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ABSTRACT
We examine geographic concentration, agglomeration, and co-location of university research
and industrial R&D in three technological areas: medical imaging, neural networks, and signal
processing.  Using data on scientific publications and patents as indicators of university research and
industrial R&D, we find strong evidence of geographic concentration in both activities at the level
of MSAs.  While evidence for agglomeration (in the sense of “excess” concentration relative to the
size of MSAs and the size distribution of research labs) of research in these fields is mixed, we do
find strong evidence of co-location of upstream and downstream activity.  We view such co-located
vertically connected activities as constituents of a “local innovation system,” and these appear to
vary markedly in their ability to convert local academic research into local commercial innovation.
We develop and test the hypothesis that the presence of a large, local, R&D-intensive firm – an
“anchor tenant” – enhances the productivity of local innovation systems by making local university
research more likely to be absorbed by and to stimulate local industrial R&D.  Presence of anchor
tenant firms may be an important factor in stimulating both the demand and supply sides of local
markets for innovation and may be an important channel for transmission of spillovers.  While our
empirical results are preliminary, they indicate that anchor tenant technology firms may be an
economically important aspect of the institutional structure of local economies.
Ajay Agrawal Iain M. Cockburn
Queen’s School of Business School of Management, Boston University
Goodes Hall 595 Commonwealth Ave
Queen's University Boston, MA 02215
Kingston, ON, Canada, K7L 3N6 and NBER
aagrawal@business.queensu.ca cockburn@bu.edu1 Introduction
Much attention has been paid to the relationship between innovation, productivity, and ge-
ography. Such focus is understandable given the public policy implications and ﬁrm-location
decisions that follow from regional variations in productivity related to the innovation pro-
cess. At the same time, increased attention has been placed on the role of the university in
the regional innovation system. This is at least in part due to the convergence of academic
and industrial research interests in areas such as computer science, electrical engineering, and
biotechnology.
In this paper, we set out to explore a set of questions concerning university research,
industrial R&D, and their joint relationship with geography. To what extent are university
research and, separately, industrial R&D, concentrated in speciﬁc technology areas? To
what extent are these activities agglomerated? To what extent are they co-located? To what
degree do regions vary in their productivity as measured by the industrial-R&D-to-university-
research ratio? What might explain this variation?
We begin by examining the degree to which university research and, separately, industrial
R&D associated with certain technical areas is concentrated and also agglomerated. We do
this for three narrow technology areas in electrical engineering: medical imaging, neural
networks, and signal processing.1 While the concept of concentration is trivial, that of
agglomeration is slightly more subtle. Agglomeration results in geographical clustering of
activity and is usually thought to reﬂect externalities from localized knowledge spillovers
and/or local “natural” advantage. Though agglomeration has been extensively documented
for manufacturing activity (for example, Rosenthal and Strange, 2001), much less work has
been done on industrial or academic innovative activity (Feldman, 1999). There is some
1Medical imaging technology facilitates the noninvasive generation of internal body images by employing
techniques such as magnetic resonance imaging, ultrasound, nuclear medicine, and X-ray computed tomog-
raphy. Neural networks are a form of multiprocessor computer systems based on collections of mathematical
models that emulate some of the observed properties of biological nervous systems and draw on the analogies of
adaptive biological learning. Signal processing technology enables the processing (e.g., ﬁltering, compression,
decompression) of signals (e.g., an analog electrical voltage or current, the digital output from the readout sys-
tem of a compact disc player) and is used in a wide variety of applications such as mobile phones, multimedia
computers, video recorders, hard disc drive controllers, and modems.
1evidence that the geographic clustering of economic activity is stronger in research-intensive
industries. Audretsch and Feldman (1996), and Jaﬀe et al. (1993) found that the “paper
trail” of spillovers documented by patent citations is also signiﬁcantly localized. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that signiﬁcant clusters may be present in areas such as pharmaceutical or
biotech R&D2 but there is little systematic evidence regarding its prevalence. While there
remains little debate that many technologies are geographically concentrated, it does not
follow that they are necessarily agglomerated. It is possible that agglomeration may be more
apparent than real: a test for the presence of agglomeration eﬀects must compare observed
levels of concentration to those that would be expected to arise as the result of a random
distribution of activity across geographic space, controlling for the size of the geographic unit
and the size distribution of production units (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997).
We ﬁnd little evidence of agglomeration of university engineering research in the three
technologies under investigation. The apparent presence of clusters of academic activity
in these technology ﬁelds in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) such as San Francisco-
Oakland-San Jose, New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange
County, and Boston-Worcester-Lawrence is accounted for by higher levels of academic re-
search in these MSAs and the size distribution of university labs. By contrast, for industrial
R&D in these technologies, we do ﬁnd some evidence of “excess” concentration. However,
the quite low values which we obtain for the Ellison-Glaeser index are somewhat surprising:
anecdotal evidence suggests a much larger agglomeration eﬀect.
We then move on to explore the degree to which university research and commercial
activity are co-located. Anecdotal evidence suggests that local innovation systems play a
very important role in commercializing academic research, and our results suggest that these
upstream-downstream activities are indeed co-located to a considerable extent. Our measures
of academic research activity in these three technologies are strongly correlated at the regional
level with measures of downstream industrial R&D activity, even after controlling for regional
variations in size and economic activity. However, despite the positive correlation between
2See Prevezer (1997).
2measures of these activities, we also note that there is signiﬁcant variation across regions
in the relationship between them. The productivity of local innovation systems varies quite
substantially, and in the ﬁnal section of the paper, we explore one hypothesis that may explain
a signiﬁcant portion of the variation. This is the “anchor tenant” hypothesis.
The classic “anchor tenant” is the large department store in a retail shopping mall that
creates demand externalities for the other shops. Large department stores with a recognized
name generate mall traﬃc that indirectly increases the sales of lesser-known stores. Pashigian
and Gould (1998) examined the degree to which mall developers internalize these externalities
by oﬀering rent subsidies to anchor tenants and charging rent premiums to other mall tenants.
In our context, we deﬁne an anchor tenant as a large ﬁrm that is: 1) heavily engaged in
R&D in general and 2) has at least minor absorptive capacity in a particular technology within
a particular region. Anchor tenants may play a very important role in both creating and
capturing externalities within local innovation systems. Anchor tenants create externalities
by thickening markets and stimulating demand. They capture externalities by directly and
indirectly increasing the absorptive capacity of the region for early-stage university-based
research.
Our hypothesis is that the presence of an anchor tenant in an MSA enhances the regional
innovation system such that local university research is more likely to be absorbed by and
stimulate local industrial R&D. There are several reasons for thinking that this may be so.
First, anchor tenants may be directly involved in the commercialization of university inven-
tions. There are many examples of large, established ﬁrms working directly with universities
in the context of collaborative research, co-supervising graduate students, sponsoring labs,
licensing the rights to university inventions, recruiting graduate students, and hiring profes-
sors as consultants to directly leverage university research (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002;
Agrawal, 2002).
Second, the anchor tenant may also indirectly stimulate innovative activity by enhancing
both the supply and demand sides of the market for new technologies. Anchor tenants
thicken factor markets such as labor, including both managerial and scientiﬁc. They also
3develop social networks with suppliers, buyers, and partners on which smaller ﬁrms can
draw. The anchor tenant’s demands for local resources such as intellectual-property legal
counsel, technology-oriented marketing, and human resources services also thicken markets
which beneﬁt smaller ﬁrms.
Less often discussed is the eﬀect of established ﬁrms on the demand side of technology
markets. Anchor tenants are likely to enjoy economies of scope. Economies of scope that
result from multiple product oﬀerings enable anchor tenants to invest in the development
of innovations with uncertain application that other ﬁrms may not be able to justify. To
this end, anchor tenants play an important role by either directly absorbing local university
research or absorbing further developed industrial R&D output from smaller ﬁrms.
Additionally, anchor tenants purchase products, licenses, consulting services, and perhaps
entire companies. In other words, anchor tenants may facilitate a vibrant intermediate market
between university research and large-scale production for end consumers. For example, many
young technology ﬁrms survive on consulting revenues during their early years while they
develop their ﬁrst product (Roberts, 1991). The transaction costs associated with person-
to-person interactions involved in consulting engagements strongly favor local clients. Thus,
local anchor tenants that are consumers of local specialized consulting services may indirectly
support industrial R&D in a particular technology area.
Anchor tenants also may utilize their economies of scope by bundling new innovations
with existing products. So a young ﬁrm that develops a software innovation may license
that innovation to the anchor tenant that bundles the software with its own hardware and
distributes the product through its established distribution system. The high uncertainty
associated with early-stage innovations, especially coupled with the high uncertainty associ-
ated with early-stage ﬁrms, favors local partners where frequent meetings with low transaction
costs are possible. Thus, anchor tenants may play a critical, but indirect, role in stimulating
industrial R&D that builds on local university research by stimulating downstream demand.
In the ﬁnal part of the empirical analysis, we speciﬁcally examine the indirect role of the
anchor tenant by examining its eﬀect on the industrial R&D output of the local economic
4“fringe.”
Our ﬁndings support the anchor tenant hypothesis. We ﬁnd a large positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the presence of an anchor tenant on the relationship between
academic engineering research in a region and corresponding downstream industrial R&D ac-
tivity. Anchor tenant ﬁrms appear to play an important role in mediating research spillovers.
2 Literature
Our approach to exploring the questions articulated above builds on a rich literature that
examines the economic and social factors at the nexus of innovation, productivity, and ge-
ography. In particular, our work draws from a subset of this literature that focuses on the
role of the research university. This includes research on: 1) the characteristics of ﬁrms that
utilize university spillovers, 2) the characteristics of universities that generate spillovers, 3)
the characteristics of the channels through which university knowledge spills over, and 4)
geography and university spillovers. We brieﬂy review this prior work.
A variety of hypotheses have been proposed to explain the variance in ability of ﬁrms
to utilize knowledge spillovers. Most of these focus on the capabilities and connectedness of
the ﬁrm. Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) introduce the concept of ‘absorptive capacity’
and argue that a ﬁrm’s ability to apply university research for its own commercial gain is a
function of its own investment in R&D. Cockburn and Henderson (1998) build on this notion,
but add that the degree to which ﬁrms are “connected” to universities is also important for
utilizing knowledge spillovers. Lim (2000) restructures the above two concepts and argues
that the absorptive capacity of ﬁrms is primarily a function of its connectedness, of which its
investment in in-house R&D is just one of several components.
Zucker et al. (1998) investigate the importance of connectedness to ﬁrms by examining
their location decisions relative to star university scientists. Shane and Stuart (2002) study
university start-up ﬁrms and examine the importance of connectedness, not with the scientiﬁc
community, but rather with the venture capital community. Ziedonis (1999) does not consider
connectedness, but instead examines the ﬁrm’s related knowledge assets and its ability to
5evaluate external technology in terms of its likelihood of licensing a particular university
technology as well as its likelihood of taking an option prior to licensing.
In addition to the connectedness and capabilities of ﬁrms that inﬂuence their ability to
utilize university research, the characteristics of universities that inﬂuence spillovers from
the supply side have been examined. Henderson et al. (1998) investigate the change in
quality of university patents after the Bayh-Dole Act was passed in 1980. Thursby and
Thursby (2002) develop a model to examine the extent to which the increase in university
licensing is due to a fundamental change in the nature of research or just in the propensity to
patent. Feldman et al. (2002) investigate the eﬀect of licensing agreements involving equity
rather than only cash payments. Jensen and Thursby (1998) examine the degree to which
university inventions are so early-stage that they require the cooperation of the inventor
to develop. Finally, Di Gregorio and Shane (2000) examine performance across university
licensing oﬃces and explore why some universities generate more new companies to exploit
their intellectual property than others.
The channels through which knowledge is passed from universities to ﬁrms have been
investigated from a number of perspectives. Cohen et al. (1998) and Cohen et al. (2002) both
examine the relative importance of the complete set of transfer channels from the perspective
of the knowledge recipient, namely ﬁrms. Agrawal and Henderson (2002) focus particularly
on the comparison between patents and papers, but also analyze the relative importance of
the complete set of transfer channels from the perspective of the knowledge creator, namely
professors. Within the context of licensed patented inventions, Colyvas et al. (2002) examine
the importance of transfer channels that complement patent licensing across diﬀerent types
of technologies. In addition, Shane (2002) investigates the question of when it is best for
a university to license an invention back to the inventor by considering the eﬀectiveness of
diﬀerent transfer channels, subject to the nature of the technology and its appropriability.
Finally, several studies focus on geography and knowledge spillovers. These studies mea-
sure knowledge inputs and associated outputs and examine their relationship across geo-
graphic space. The inputs and outputs considered vary from study to study, as does the
6geographic unit of analysis. Jaﬀe (1989) relates the input “federal research funding” to the
output “new patents issued” at the state level. Jaﬀe et al. (1993) relate the input “original
patents” to the output “patents that cite the original patents” at the city level. Audretsch
and Feldman (1996) relate the input “local university research funding” to the output “local
industry value-added” at the state level. Zucker et al. (1998) relate the input “number of
local research stars” to the output “number of new local biotech ﬁrms” at the economic region
level. Branstetter (2000) relates the input “scientiﬁc publications from the University of Cal-
ifornia” to the output “patents that cite those papers” at the the state level. Finally, Agrawal
(2002) relates the input “hours of interaction with the MIT professor associated with a par-
ticular patented invention” to the output “likelihood or degree of success of commercializing
that invention” and evaluates the impact of distance on this eﬀect.
3 Variables and Data
For this study, we collected data on indicators of academic research activity and industrial
R&D as well as a variety of control variables for the 268 US metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs) and consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs) and the 25 Canadian census
metropolitan areas (CMAs) - hereinafter collectively referred to as the “MSAs.”3 We removed
39 MSAs since their level of both academic and industrial electrical engineering research is
de minimis, resulting in a working sample of 254 local economies.4
3While MSAs and CMAs are similar in spirit, they are deﬁned slightly diﬀerently. The Canadian criterion
requires that the urban core have a population of at least 100,000 for a metropolitan area to exist. In contrast,
for the period 1990 to 2000, the United States had two criteria to determine whether or not a metropolitan
area existed. In the United States, a metropolitan area exists where there is either a city of 50,000 or more
inhabitants or a Census Bureau deﬁned urban area, i.e., a population of at least 50,000 and a total metropolitan
population of at least 100,000 (75,000 in New England). Thus, the Canadian approach is the more restrictive
of the two.
4Speciﬁcally, MSAs were dropped from the sample if they had both fewer than ﬁve publications in IEEE
journals per million inhabitants and fewer than 20 patents in electrical engineering per million inhabitants.
73.1 Industrial R&D (Patents)
We use patent counts to measure industrial R&D. Patent counts are generated by ﬁrst creat-
ing a list of all patents that contain at least one US classiﬁcation from a set of classiﬁcations
associated with a particular technological area (e.g., medical imaging). The sets of US classi-
ﬁcations used were created in consultation with electrical engineering professors who work on
the technologies under investigation. The set of classiﬁcations associated with each technol-
ogy is described in Appendix A. The queries are constrained to patents that have application
dates between 1991 and 1997, inclusive. Patents are then assigned to MSAs by the address
of the ﬁrst inventor. It is important to note that the inventor MSA is often diﬀerent from the
assignee MSA. For example, many patents assigned to IBM Corp. in New York are invented
by scientists and engineers located at labs in other MSAs.
There are three areas of concern associated with this measure of industrial R&D. First,
not all industrial R&D results in patents. In fact, it has been well documented that for
strategic reasons, many innovations generated from industrial R&D are protected by trade
secret, other forms of intellectual property, or are not protected at all due to short product
life cycles or diﬃculties associated with patenting (Cohen, 1998). This is particularly true for
software for which there has been a substantial increase in the propensity to patent during
the period under investigation.
Second, there is noise generated by our use of the classiﬁcation system. US patent clas-
siﬁcations do not exactly match the technology areas we are investigating. Most patents are
assigned multiple classiﬁcations as their application spans several areas. However, the inven-
tion may be more related to some areas for which it is classiﬁed than others. As a result,
the data suﬀers from both false positive and false negative results. In other words, the data
contain patents that are not directly related to the technology under investigation and the
data are missing patents that should be included. Third, not all patents represent the same
level of economic importance.
To evaluate the seriousness of these concerns, we consider the degree of systematic bias by
MSA that we might expect on any of these dimensions. For example, might some MSAs have
8a lower R&D-to-patent ratio than others? While we do not expect this to be a signiﬁcant
problem in general, results should be interpreted with caution and particular attention paid
to the eﬀect of MSAs that have a notably high propensity towards software development,
such as Seattle and San Francisco.
We also do not expect a systematic bias in terms of classiﬁcation-related noise by MSA.
This is particularly true given the results we discuss later in the paper regarding the lack of
agglomeration of commercialization activity in speciﬁc technological areas. Similarly, we do
not expect a systematic bias in the economic importance of patents by MSA. However, this
could be at least partly controlled for by weighting the importance of patents by citations,
which is often done when using these measures. We plan to do this in the next draft of this
paper.
The data used to generate this metric are collected from the United States Patent and
Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO).
3.2 University Research (University Publications)
We use publication counts to measure university research activity. Speciﬁcally, we use author-
MSA counts based on articles by university-based authors in particular journals. For example,
to measure university research activity in the area of medical imaging, we begin by generating
a list of all the articles that appeared in the journal IEEE Transactions on Medical Imaging
during a particular time period (1991-1997). Then, we increment the MSA counter for the
state associated with each university-based author. So, a paper by three authors, two of
whom are from Boston-Worcester-Lawrence and one who is from Washington-Baltimore, will
increment the Boston counter by two and the Washington counter by one. Also, each author
is categorized by type: public, private, or university. Only university authors increment the
MSA counters when measuring university research.
There are ﬁve areas of concern associated with this measure of university research. First,
not all research is published. Agrawal and Henderson (2002) report that MIT electrical and
mechanical engineering professors estimate that just less than 20% of the new knowledge gen-
9erated by research at their labs utilized by industry is passed through the publishing channel.
Other important channels of knowledge transfer include consulting, recruiting graduate stu-
dents, research collaborations, and to a lesser extent, conferences, informal conversations, and
patenting. Compared to Agrawal and Henderson, Cohen et al. (1998) report that almost
the same fraction (20%) of U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms consider university publishing to be an
important knowledge transfer channel for their industry. Thus, publishing only represents a
fraction of overall university research output.
Second, not all published research on a particular technology is contained in the journals
included in our analysis. For example, only a fraction of articles associated with medical
imaging are published in the journal IEEE Transactions on Medical Imaging. Many other
journals publish articles relevant to medical imaging. This is quickly veriﬁed by examining
the citations in articles published in IEEE Transactions on Medical Imaging, which include
references to dozens of other journals. However, other journals are not also included in the
count because they also contain articles on topics outside of medical imaging.
Third, not all articles represent the same quality of research. Some articles are obviously
more important than others and result from higher-quality research or longer-term projects.
A fourth issue is the degree to which articles are relevant for industrial application. Since
the measure of university activity is being compared to a measure of industrial activity, an
implicit assumption is that all research is equally relevant for commercial application. This
assumption is clearly not true.
Finally, the author-MSA metric may cause concern. For example, consider the case of
two articles of identical quality where one has a single author in Boston and the other has
three coauthors in Boston. The ﬁrst paper will increment the Boston paper counter by one,
whereas the second paper will increment the Boston paper counter by three. So, coauthored
papers have a greater inﬂuence on the research metric than single-authored papers.
Our ﬁrst response to each of these concerns is to consider whether we might expect system-
atic bias on any of these dimensions across MSAs. For example, might university researchers
in some regions be more likely than those in other regions to publish their results, rather than
10disseminate their results through other channels? Given the importance of publications as a
nearly universal metric for research performance, this would seem unlikely. However, it might
be the case that some regions have, on average, higher-quality engineering departments that
attract faculty members who are more publishing-oriented than their colleagues elsewhere.
Similarly, are professors in some regions more likely than their colleagues in other regions
to publish in the particular journals we include in our analysis, given that they publish their
ﬁndings somewhere? We consulted two electrical engineering professors regarding which
journals we should include in our analysis. We selected journals based on two criteria: 1) the
journal is considered amongst the top journals that publish research on the topic under study
and 2) all the articles included in the journal are related to the topic under study. We feel
reasonably conﬁdent that the journals selected for this study fulﬁll these criteria. However,
it may be the case that certain factors, such as the location of the journal editors during the
period under study, introduce bias in terms of the frequency of articles that are published
from particular regions.
There also is no reason to believe that the quality of articles by university researchers
from particular regions is systematically higher than those from other regions. The edito-
rial function of the journal should control for this, at least to some degree. However, one
could argue that the top-ranked engineering departments are clustered in a small number
of states, that research quality is highly correlated with department ranking, that journals
accept papers that fall within a certain quality range, and thus that the quality of research
published in a particular journal does indeed vary (within the range allowable by the partic-
ular publication) systematically by region. The electrical engineering professors we consulted
with indicated that they do not believe this to be the case with the journals we examine in
this study. However, we plan to control for this in the next draft of this paper by weighting
papers by citation, which is a technique commonly used to control for “quality” by scholars
who employ bibliometric data.
Perhaps our greatest area of concern with this measure comes from the potential bias
associated with the relationship between the region and the degree to which research is
11applied rather than basic. University departments do sometimes tip towards a majority of
either basic or applied research. However, we suspect that this problem is constrained by the
editorial guidelines of the journals from which this data is generated, since we speciﬁcally
selected journals that are reasonably applied.
Finally, the author-MSA metric oﬀers the desirable characteristic of multiple counts per
MSA per paper. Since we consider each publication to represent a research eﬀort generating
new knowledge, we count each region that has direct, local access to that eﬀort and knowl-
edge. Measures of local access to authors is important given our assumption about the tacit
nature of knowledge associated with early-stage university research. So, in the case of papers
with authors from diﬀerent regions this metric attributes research activity to each region in-
volved. Similarly, for papers that have multiple authors from the same region, the counter is
incremented to reﬂect the number of authors. An alternative measure might be to only count
ﬁrst authors. This way, each paper would contribute equal weight. However, this would not
reﬂect the degree to which coauthors facilitate increased access to and dissemination of tacit
knowledge to industry.
The data used to generate this metric is collected from the Institute for Scientiﬁc Infor-
mation’s Science Citation Index. Data is collected from the journals IEEE Transactions on
Medical Imaging, IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, and IEEE Transactions on Signal
Processing for analyses of medical imaging, neural networks, and signal processing, respec-
tively. All articles from these journals that were published between the years 1991 through
1997, inclusive, are included in the analysis.
3.3 Anchor Tenant (Large R&D Capability, Absorptive Capacity in Par-
ticular Technology)
As described in the Introduction, we deﬁne an anchor tenant for a particular MSA and
technology (e.g., Boston, medical imaging) as a ﬁrm that meets two conditions. First, the
ﬁrm must have some absorptive capacity in the particular technology area. This is measured
by the presence of at least one patent granted to the ﬁrm from the set of speciﬁed US
12classiﬁcations during the period under investigation (1991-1997 inclusive). Second, the ﬁrm
must demonstrate that it is heavily involved in R&D in general. This is measured by the
presence of at least one thousand patents granted to the ﬁrm, with any US classiﬁcation,
during the period under investigation. (We ﬁnd similar results where this threshold is reduced
to 500 patents.) A ﬁrm that meets both of these conditions is considered an anchor tenant.
For example, Texas Instruments, Inc. is an anchor tenant in the Dallas-Fort Worth
metropolitan area in the technological areas of signal processing and neural networks. It
satisﬁes the two conditions described above because it has conducted a great deal of R&D
in general and at least some on signal processing and neural networks speciﬁcally. However,
the same ﬁrm is not an anchor tenant in medical imaging as it has not conducted any R&D
(by our measure) in this area and thus has no absorptive capacity related to this technology.
Also, since our analysis is at the research facility level, it is possible for ﬁrms to be anchor
tenants in multiple locations. For example, Motorola, Inc. is an anchor tenant in signal
processing in both the Chicago-Gary-Kenosha and the Phoenix-Mesa metropolitan areas.
The idea of the “anchor tenant” eﬀect is illustrated in a stylized fashion by four “matched
pairs” of MSAs in Table I. These pairs of MSAs are similar in terms of size (population) and
university research in the area of medical imaging (publications). However, their commercial
R&D as measured by patents varies considerably. For example, the Los Angeles MSA is
similar to the New York MSA in size and level of university research in medical imaging,
but the New York MSA has two anchor tenants (IBM and Lucent) while Los Angeles has
none in this technology area; New York has approximately double the number of industry
patents as L.A. Similarly, the San Francisco and Boston MSAs are similar in size and level of
university research in medical imaging, but San Francisco has two anchor tenants (Sun and
HP) while Boston has none; again, the MSA with an anchor tenant has substantially more
industry patents. The same pattern holds when comparing Minneapolis (3M) with Atlanta
and Pittsburgh with Rochester (Eastman Kodak).
It is important to note that while the anchor tenant may play an important role in
stimulating industrial research, that ﬁrm is not necessarily responsible for the majority of
13industrial research on that topic in the MSA under investigation. For example, Table II
illustrates that the two anchor tenants in the New York MSA are only responsible for two
of that region’s 43 industrial patents in medical imaging. Similarly, Table III illustrates that
the anchor tenant in the Minneapolis MSA is responsible for only three of that area’s 15
industrial patents. When we test the anchor tenant hypothesis, we remove patents by the
anchor tenant. The empirical analysis is described in detail below.
3.4 Control Variables
A variety of MSA level control variables are used throughout the analysis. These include
population, personal income per capita, professional-scientiﬁc-technical services, general elec-
trical engineering patents, general electrical engineering papers, all patents, and all papers
from journals included in the ISI’s Science Citation Index. Population data are from the U.S.
Bureau of the Census5 and Statistics Canada.6 Personal income per capita and professional-
scientiﬁc-technical services are also both from the Census Bureau 7 and Statistics Canada.8
The Professional, Scientiﬁc, and Technical Services sector (sector 54) of the 1997 Economic
Census covers establishments with payroll that specialize in performing professional, scien-
tiﬁc, and technical activities for others. The Census Bureau states that “these activities
require a high degree of expertise and training.”
General electrical engineering patents are counted by including all US patents that have
been designated international patent classiﬁcations within the set: G01-G12 or H01-H05. The
general categories for these classiﬁcations are physics (“G”) and electricity (“H”). General
electrical engineering papers are counted by including all IEEE publications. The Institute for
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) is a non-proﬁt, technical professional association.
5State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1997-98, Table B-1.
61996 Census of Canada, Proﬁle Data, Ottawa, Canada.
7Gaquin, Derdre A. and DeBrandt, Katherine A., eds. 2000 County and City Extra: Annual Metro, City,
and County Data Book, Ninth Edition. Lanham, MD: Bernan Press, 2000. Table C, page 807-887. Data from
the 1997 United States Economic Census, U.S. Census Bureau.
8Labour Force Historical Review (Statistics Canada data table), 1999. ”Employment by Census Metropoli-
tan Area, 3 month moving average.” (averaged over 12 months to generate 1997 estimate). Accessed with
Beyond 20/20 Professional Browser.
14In 2002, the Institute had over 360,000 individual members in 150 countries, held over 300
major conferences per year, and claimed to produce 30 % of the world’s published literature
in electrical engineering, computers, and control technology.9
3.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table IV reports the descriptive statistics for variables constructed from these sources for
each of the MSAs in our working sample.
While the range of the paper and patent counts in each technology area is quite large,
their distribution is highly left-skewed. In medical imaging, 185 out 254 MSAs had no
publications and 198 had no patents. Similarly, in signal processing, there were 154 MSAs
with no publications and 108 with no patents, while in neural networks, 158 MSAs were
without papers and 187 without patents. Signal processing is signiﬁcantly “larger” than
the other two technologies, averaging almost three times more papers and eight times more
patents per MSA.
As can be seen in the Table, MSAs vary considerably in size, with population ranging
from just over 82,000 (Pine Bluﬀ, AR) to almost 20 million (New York–Northern New Jersey–
Long Island.) Just under 9% of the sample are located in Canada. One measure of the
technology-intensity of these local economies is the fraction of the population falling into the
Professional, Scientiﬁc, and Technical (PST) category. PST workers averaged just under 2%
of the population, with a maximum of 5% and a minimum of 0.3%. Another indicator is
the volume of patenting. Patents issued to private-sector assignees in all technology classes
averaged about 1000 per MSA, ranging from only 1 to more than 28,000. In per capita terms,
patents in classes ranged eight per thousand inhabitants to less than 0.007. Just over 1/3 of
these patents were in electrical engineering.
9http://www.ieee.org/about/
154 Empirical Testing
4.1 Agglomeration, Geographical Concentration, and the Location of Re-
search Activity
Research activity in our three technology areas is not evenly dispersed across North America.
In fact, counts of patents and papers in these areas are highly concentrated within a handful
of MSAs. This concentration of activity can be seen in summary measures such as the
“CR4.” In each technology area, the top four MSAs account for about 42% of patents, and
the four largest MSAs account for 24% of medical imaging papers, 27% of neural networks
papers, and 27% of signal processing papers. A more broad-reaching measure of geographical
concentration is the “locational Gini” coeﬃcient, which measures the extent to which the
distribution of activity across geographical units departs from a uniform allocation. Two
versions of this measure are presented: the “raw” Gini coeﬃcient, based on the share of each
activity in total activity, and the “relative” Gini coeﬃcient.10 Table V reports the results of
computing locational Gini coeﬃcients for the paper and patent counts across MSAs.
The high values obtained for the raw Gini coeﬃcient on paper counts by MSA indicate
that academic research in all three technology areas is highly geographically concentrated. (If
the activity is evenly distributed across geographical units, GL = 0, while if all the activity
is concentrated in a single geographical unit, GL → 0.5.) Interestingly, similar results are
obtained when the Gini is recomputed relative to the distribution of total EE activity.11 There
are no substantive diﬀerences in the degree of geographic concentration across technologies
or between papers and patents. The only markedly diﬀerent results are obtained when we
compare the distribution of electrical engineering in general. Compared to results for the
narrower technology areas, academic publication activity in the broader ﬁeld of electrical



















when the Gini is calculated relative to a broader activity Zi.
11The relatively large numbers of MSAs with no measured activity may be biasing these calculations, but
deleting observations with zero counts reduced these coeﬃcients by only a few percent.
16engineering is somewhat less geographically concentrated relative to the distribution of all
scientiﬁc publishing, and commercial patenting activity in electrical engineering relative to
total patenting is much less concentrated.
Of course, simply observing this geographic concentration is not an indication that the
location of research is necessarily a reﬂection of agglomeration driven by localized spillovers
or natural advantage. To infer agglomeration from the geographic distribution of activity,
its degree of concentration must be compared to that which would arise from a random dis-
tribution of production units across geographic areas. One way to do this is by calculating
the Ellison-Glaeser (1997) index, which controls for variation in the size distribution of pro-
duction units and in the size of geographic areas as well as compares the actual distribution
of activity with a benchmark corresponding to a “dartboard” allocation of production units
across states.
Table VI presents values of the Ellison-Glaeser index computed for each measure of re-
search activity. The index is given by the formula
γ ≡
M









where, for papers, si is the share of each MSA in publications in the technology area, xi is each
MSA’s share of total academic publications, and H is the Herﬁndahl index of publications in
the technology area across universities. For patents, si is the share of each MSA in patents
in that technology area, xi is the share of each state in total patents, and H is the Herﬁndahl
index of patents in the technology across assignee-MSA units.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd only mixed evidence of agglomeration in any of the three technology
areas. In the ﬁrst panel of Table VI, γ is computed relative to electrical engineering, that is
to say, the xi’s are MSA shares in total academic electrical engineering publications, or total
electrical engineering patents. While there appears to be more agglomeration in commercial
R&D activity than in academic research, the γs are all quite small. Somewhat diﬀerent
results are obtained when the γs are computed relative to total scientiﬁc or R&D activity in
all areas. As can be seen in the second panel of Table VI, the γs for patents are signiﬁcantly
larger, particularly for neural networks and signal processing, where they are almost 30 times
17the value in the ﬁrst panel. Though it is diﬃcult to interpret the index values other than
relative to a salient benchmark, Ellison and Glaeser suggested a cutoﬀ of γ<0.02 to describe
US manufacturing industries as “not very concentrated,” and we infer from these results that
some degree of “excess” concentration of R&D activity within MSAs is present.
4.2 Are Papers and Patents Co-located?
Although we ﬁnd mixed evidence for agglomeration of publication activity or patenting ac-
tivity in these technologies, this does not mean that publication and patenting are not co-
located.12 Indeed, if our notion of localized innovation systems is correct, then a strong
statistical relationship should exist between the level of publications in a given technological
area produced in an MSA and the level of patents in the technological area which originate
in that MSA.
One piece of evidence for co-location is the raw correlation between papers and patents
across MSAs, which is quite high: 0.67 for medical imaging, 0.52 for neural networks, and 0.77
for signal processing (Table VII.) These correlations are robust to the exclusion of outliers,
and non-parametric measures of association derived from the cross-tabulation of counts show
a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship. But this measure confounds the eﬀect of
the size of the MSA on both variables, so a better descriptive parameter is the coeﬃcient on
papers in a regression of patents on to papers and a control for the size of the MSA.
Tables VIII gives results from regressing patents on to papers. The univariate regression
results simply restate the correlation coeﬃcients. But even when we control for size using
PST LABOR, in each of the three technologies we get a positive and strongly signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient on papers. The same result holds using various other size controls such as popu-
lation or the total number of IEEE publications or electrical engineering patents originating
12Co-location is diﬀerent from co-agglomeration. Along with their index of agglomeration, Ellison-Glaeser
propose an index of co-agglomeration which accounts for size diﬀerences across geographic and production
units. As with the univariate indexes, we ﬁnd mixed evidence for signiﬁcant “excess” co-location of papers and
patents in each technology area: relative to electrical engineering, we obtained values of Ellison-Glaeser’s γ
c of
0.008 for medical imaging, 0.004 for neural networks, and 0.007 for signal processing; relative to all science, we
obtained values of 0.002 medical imaging, -0.009 for neural networks, and 0.053 for signal processing. Again,
these numbers are diﬃcult to interpret without an appropriate benchmark.
18from the MSA. Taken at face value, these results imply that there is a very strong co-location
eﬀect: local patents in a technological area are strongly associated with the presence of up-
stream academic science. Here, and in the additional regressions reported below, we place no
structural interpretation on the results. Though there are good reasons to believe that papers
“cause” patents in the sense that downstream industrial R&D activity relies on upstream sci-
ence, it is quite possible that causation runs in the opposite direction. We have not speciﬁed
a production function technology for R&D nor any assumptions about the behavior of actors
in this process. Rather, the regressions are presented as descriptive analyses of reduced form
associations in the data.
These OLS regressions are estimated using a simple linear functional form; given the
disparity in size over the sample of MSAs, there is likely to be a signiﬁcant amount of
heteroscedasticity. White’s test statistic conﬁrms this hypothesis, rejecting the null of i.i.d.
errors at P>0.0001. The presence of many zeroes in both the dependent variable and the
main explanatory variable prevents us from using a log-log speciﬁcation, which would be
less vulnerable to this problem. We therefore re-estimated some equations using weighted
least squares to account for heteroscedasticity under the assumption that the variance of the
error term is inversely proportional to population. This has a relatively small impact on the
standard errors relative to the unweighted regressions.13
One important source of speciﬁcation error arises from the measurement properties of the
dependent variables in these regressions. As counts of patents, these variables take on only
non-negative integer values, suggesting that a Poisson-type model is appropriate. Table IX
presents results from re-estimating these models using Poisson regressions. The functional
form is
E[PATENTS]=exp(α + βPAPERS)( 2 )
Note that since PAPERS is zero for many observations, it is not possible to estimate the
standard log-log functional form, and β cannot therefore be read directly as an elasticity. As
in the OLS regressions, we again ﬁnd a positive and strongly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on PAPERS
13However, computing robust standard errors using Stata’s Huber-White estimator resulted in substantial
increases, suggesting that the linear model is seriously misspeciﬁed.
19in all three technologies. However, this is driven largely by confounding with the size of MSAs;
when ln(PST LABOR) is included in the regression, the PAPERS variable is knocked out.
Moreover, these data are badly over-dispersed relative to the Poisson distribution: the χ2
goodness-of-ﬁt statistic is very large in all cases, rejecting the null of mean = variance at
P>0.0001.
One option for addressing over-dispersion is to use negative binomial regression, eﬀectively
adding a random eﬀect to the model. As can be seen in Table X, while the coeﬃcient
estimates are broadly similar, the standard errors increase by an order of magnitude. Using
this speciﬁcation, PAPERS is only signiﬁcant for the case of signal processing. However, a
closer look at the data suggests that the negative binomial model may not be appropriate. The
large number of zero patent counts suggests an alternative reason why the mean = variance
property of the Poisson distribution is violated here; many MSAs appear to have no activity
in these technology areas, and therefore cannot be expected to generate patents. If this is the
case, then a diﬀerent model is appropriate. Here we use the ZIP (“Zero-Inﬂated Poisson”)
model proposed by Lambert (1992).14 In this model, there are two unobserved states of the
world: Regime 1) counts greater than zero are very rarely observed and Regime 2) counts are
generated by a standard Poisson process in which zeroes can occur, but counts of one or more
are also likely to be observed. The probability of being in one regime or the other can be
modeled as logit or probit, with counts in the latter regime following the usual Poisson density
function. The likelihood function is built up from two components, the Poisson equation and
the “inﬂation” equation, and two sets of coeﬃcients are estimated, one for the covariates in
the Poisson part of the model and one for the logit/probit “inﬂation” equation.
Results from estimating the ZIP model are presented in Table XI. In each case, the “inﬂa-
tion” equation is assumed to be logit, with ln(population), share of EE in total patents, and
a dummy for NO IEEE PAPERS as explanatory variables. In two out of three technologies,
we again ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on papers.
14See also Greene (1994).
204.3 Anchor Tenants and Productivity
Even after controlling for size, there is signiﬁcant dispersion about the regression line of
patents on papers. (See Figures 1 to 3.) One way to interpret this dispersion is in terms of
ability of MSAs’ local innovation systems to convert local science into local industrial innova-
tion. Substantial variation in the patent/paper ratio even after controlling for size suggests
that other characteristics of MSAs may be important determinants of the productivity of
local innovation systems. Indeed, our core hypothesis in this study is that the presence of
anchor tenants is a signiﬁcant factor driving productivity. A simple test of this hypothesis is
to include a measure of anchor tenants in the regressions of patents on to papers. Results for
the OLS model are presented in Table XII. The measure of the presence of anchor tenants
is ANCHORS, an indicator variable which =1 when there is at least one large anchor tenant
in the MSA. (“Large” anchor tenants were issued at least 1000 patents during the sample
period.) Essentially similar results were obtained using a measure based on the presence of
medium-sized anchor tenants (500 patents) and using a direct count of anchor tenants instead
of a dummy variable. As before, we control for the size of the MSA with PST LABOR and
use weighted least squares to control for heteroscedasticity. Note that patents assigned to
the anchor ﬁrm(s) are netted out from the dependent variable, so that the model should be
thought of as referring to the relationship between university research and the patenting of
the “fringe” of non-anchors. 15
The results are striking: in all three technology areas, the coeﬃcient on the interaction
term is positive and strongly signiﬁcant. For medical imaging and signal processing in MSAs
which have an anchor tenant, the coeﬃcient on PAPERS is roughly two to three times larger.
For neural networks, the coeﬃcient on PAPERS goes from negative and weakly signiﬁcant
to positive and signiﬁcant when an anchor tenant is present.
The same ﬂavor of results is obtained from estimating Poisson and Negative Binomial
15Anchor ﬁrms account for a varying fraction of total patenting in each technology and MSA. On average,
this fraction is quite small (about 2%) but in a small number of MSAs it is much larger (over 90%). Netting
out patents by anchor ﬁrms is important to avoid inducing a spurious correlation between the dependent
variable and the anchor variable, but, as can be seen in the correlations reported in Table VII, the two counts
are eﬀectively very similar.
21versions of this model, though, as argued above, there is reason to believe that these two
models are misspeciﬁed. Given the multiplicative model and problems in handling zeroes in
the PAPERS variable, ANCHOR enters the regression without an interaction term. Again,
we ﬁnd evidence for a positive impact of anchor tenants on the rate at which academic
research is converted into patents in the local economy. The coeﬃcient on the ANCHOR
dummy is positive for all three technologies, though the standard errors are unstable. Our
preferred speciﬁcation is the ZIP model (see Table XIII), and here we ﬁnd positive and
strongly signiﬁcant eﬀects of the presence of anchor tenants. The impact is considerable:
at the mean, the marginal impact of one more paper on the expected number of patents in
medical imaging is 1.55 times larger in the presence of an anchor tenant, 2.7 times larger in
neural networks, and 1.64 times larger in signal processing.
5 Conclusions
Important connections between university research and industrial R&D exist, but these are
subtle and quite diﬃcult to capture empirically. Anecdotal evidence suggests an important
role for universities in generating clusters of innovative “spin-oﬀ’ companies, although econo-
metric evidence on the presence of localized knowledge spillovers from universities is mixed.
The results reported by, for example, Jaﬀe (1989), Acs, Audretsch, and Feldman (1992), and
Anselin, Varga, and Acs (1997) provide some evidence for positive externalities generated
by university research operating over MSA-scale distances, but the estimated magnitude of
these eﬀects is quite sensitive to the level of aggregation over industries and technologies,
as well as the deﬁnition of the local area. These diﬃculties in identifying a large, uniform,
and real eﬀect of academic research operating at this geographical scale suggest that much
closer attention to measurement issues, as well as to the mechanisms and institutions through
which these spillovers are transmitted, is needed. Our ﬁndings here support this view and
prompt further close scrutiny of the phenomenon of clustering of R&D activities and of the
institutional structure of local innovation systems.
Based on the distribution of publications and patents across North American MSAs in
22three sub-areas of electrical engineering, we ﬁnd evidence of strong geographic concentration
of research. But it does not necessarily follow from this that private-sector innovative activity
is clustered in the sense of being over-concentrated relative to: 1) the geographic distribution
of research activity and 2) the size distribution of labs. Controlling for these factors, we ﬁnd
some signiﬁcant departures in the distribution of private-sector innovative activity from that
predicted by a “dartboard” model of location. But we do not ﬁnd any evidence for “excess”
geographic concentration of university research in these three technologies, suggesting that
the location of academic research may be driven by factors other than horizontal spillovers
or Marshallian natural advantage.
We do ﬁnd strong evidence for the co-location of downstream industrial R&D with up-
stream university research at the level of the MSA. While we hesitate to draw any conclusions
about a causal relationship between academic research and industrial R&D, the degree of ge-
ographical association between these activities suggests a substantial localized component of
vertical knowledge spillovers. Interestingly, the magnitude of this eﬀect appears to be strongly
mediated by the presence of anchor tenant ﬁrms in the local economy. Again, there are ob-
vious and potentially serious endogeneity issues which we have not yet addressed, but the
size and persistence of this eﬀect in our regression results suggest an economically signiﬁcant
phenomenon.
Thus, the anchor tenant hypothesis may have implications for policy and strategy. Policy-
makers are often involved in the courtship process when large ﬁrms are investigating potential
sites for a new location and accordingly may oﬀer substantial incentives to attract such ﬁrms.
In these negotiations, local governments need to know how much a large ﬁrm is worth to the
local economy; thinking about the role of anchor tenants in mediating spillovers and shaping
natural advantage may provide a useful framework for analysis. In this context it may be
helpful to consider the number and signiﬁcance of industries and technologies for which the
ﬁrm in question might be an anchor tenant in the sense we have identiﬁed here, as well as to
evaluate the extent to which the local universities produce research that is complementary
to that ﬁrm’s technologies.
23Equally, externalities associated with anchor tenants have implications for corporate strat-
egy. For example, when ﬁrms explore sites for large new R&D facilities, they may consider
the extent to which they are likely to serve as an anchor tenant in the receiving local econ-
omy and the eﬀectiveness of strategies for capturing externalities generated by their presence.
Apart from taking advantage of local governments’ willingness to oﬀer incentives to locate in
their jurisdiction, anchor tenants may be able to capture externalities through taking advance
equity stakes in “fringe” ﬁrms, or through other private contractual arrangements. At the
same time, smaller ﬁrms may realize substantial beneﬁts from considering the presence of
anchor tenants when making their location decisions.
Of course, while our results suggest that anchor tenant ﬁrms may be an important aspect
of the institutional structure of local innovation systems, it is undoubtedly premature to
speculate about speciﬁc policy implications. Much work remains to further investigate this
phenomenon.
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28Table I: Matched Pairs: Example from Medical Imaging
MSA Population University Industry Anchor
Papers Patents Tenant
L.A. Riverside Orange County 15608886 55 21 None
New York Northern NJ Long Isl. 19876488 42 43 IBM, Lucent
San Francisco Oakland San Jose 6700753 30 86 Sun, HP
Boston Worcester Lawrence 5827654 28 42 None
Minneapolis St. Paul 2792137 14 15 3M
Atlanta 3627184 11 6 None
Pittsburgh 2361019 7 1 None
Rochester 1086082 6 34 Eastman Kodak
29Table II: Matched Pairs: Los Angeles versus New York
Total Company Anchor
Patents MI Patents
Los Angeles (21 total MI patents)
Capistrano Labs Inc. 1 1
Cardiovascular Imaging Systems Inc. 4 4
Cordis Webster Inc. 19 1
Imagyn Medical Technologies Inc. 4 1
Integrated Medical Systems Inc. 1 1
International Remote Imaging Systems Inc. 11 5
Johnson & Johnson Medical Inc. 27 1
Logicon Inc. 1 1
Northrop Grumman Corp. 184 1
Sonus Pharmaceuticals Inc. 1 1
TOA Medical Electronics Co. Ltd. 2 1
Vivorx Pharmaceuticals Inc. 16 3
New York (43 total MI patents)
Biosense Inc. 6 1
Center for Laboratory Technology Inc. 1 1
Ciba Geigy Corp. 178 1
Cytometrics Inc. 1 1
Echocath Inc. 5 1
IBM Corp. 3281 1 X
Lucent Technologies Inc. 1632 1 X
Mobil Oil Corp. 68 1
Neoromedical Systems Inc. 6 5
Ortho Diagnostic Systems Inc. 11 1
Phillips Electronics NA Corp. 257 5
Sarnoﬀ Corp. 174 5
Schick Technologies Inc. 1 1
Siemens Corporate Research Inc. 104 17
Trex Medical Corp. 5 1
30Table III: Matched Pairs: Minneapolis versus Atlanta
Total Company Anchor
Patents MI Patents
Minneapolis (15 total MI patents)
Clarus Medical Systems Inc. 10 2
Eastman Kodak Co. 11 1
Imation Corp. 105 2
Insight Medical Systems Inc. 1 1
Medtronic Inc. 470 1
Micro Medical Devices Inc. 2 1
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. 2092 3 X
Picker International Inc. 2 2
Shturman Cardiology Systems Inc. 15 2
Atlanta (6 total MI patents)
General Electric Co. 6 1
Georgia Tech Research Corp. 129 2
Minolta-QMS Inc. 1 1
North American Phillips Corp. 3 2
31Table IV: Descriptive Statistics (N = 254)
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Medical Imaging
Papers 2.567 7.225 0 55
Patents 2.323 9.567 0 86
Patents (excl. anchors) 2.008 8.947 0 85
No. of anchors (> 1000) 0.031 0.196 0 2
No. of anchors (> 500) 0.039 0.232 0 2
No. of anchors (> 100) 0.122 0.552 0 5
Neural Network
Papers 2.327 6.581 0 65
Patents 2.287 9.168 0 98
Patents (excl. anchors) 1.831 7.413 0 74
No. of anchors (> 1000) 0.067 0.307 0 2
No. of anchors (> 500) 0.142 0.599 0 6
No. of anchors (> 100) 0.315 1.211 0 13
Signal Processing
Papers 7.205 19.171 0 154
Patents 18.618 72.941 0 754
Patents (excl. anchors) 15.106 59.354 0 641
No. of anchors (> 1000) 0.079 0.358 0 3
No. of anchors (> 500) 0.169 0.769 0 9
No. of anchors (> 100) 0.602 2.200 0 24
General
Canadian 0.087 0.282 0 1
Papers (all IEEE) 133.784 324.467 0 2268
Patents (all EE) 387.228 1328.765 0 14227
Papers (all in ISI) 8392.484 19756.09 0 165664
Patents (all in USPTO) 1036.563 2945.978 1 28316
Population 877316.4 1943850 82024 1.99e+07
Income per capita (000’s) 22.750 3.986 2.937 38.772
PST labor (000’s) 21.332 59.219 0.503 569.807
32T a b l eV :G i n iC o e ﬃ c i e n t s
Papers Patents
Medical Imaging
Raw locational coeﬀ. 0.443 0.469
Locational coeﬀ. relative to EE 0.440 0.456
Neural Networks
Raw locational coeﬀ. 0.424 0.458
Locational coeﬀ. relative to EE 0.451 0.454
Signal Processing
Raw locational coeﬀ. 0.427 0.449
Locational coeﬀ. relative to EE 0.384 0.363
EE locational coeﬀ. relative to total 0.342 0.195
N = 254
33Table VI: Ellison-Glaeser Indexes





i(si − xi)2 H γ
Papers
Medical Imaging 0.027 0.010 0.019 -0.009
Neural Networks 0.027 0.009 0.018 -0.009
Signal Processing 0.027 0.004 0.015 -0.012
Patents
Medical Imaging 0.050 0.024 0.019 0.006
Neural Networks 0.050 0.010 0.008 0.002
Signal Processing 0.050 0.005 0.004 0.001





i(si − xi)2 H γ
Papers
Medical Imaging 0.026 0.000 0.019 -0.011
Neural Networks 0.026 0.013 0.018 -0.006
Signal Processing 0.026 0.005 0.015 -0.010
Patents
Medical Imaging 0.036 0.035 0.019 0.018
Neural Networks 0.036 0.035 0.008 0.028
Signal Processing 0.036 0.034 0.004 0.031
N = 254





Patents (excl. anchor) 0.945 1.000





Patents (excl. anchor) 0.977 1.000





Patents (excl. anchor) 0.983 1.000
Papers 0.761 0.766 1.000
N = 254
35Table VIII: Regression Results: OLS
Medical Imaging Neural Networks Signal Processing
Patents Patents Patents Patents Patents Patents
Papers 0.769*** 0.424*** 0.724*** -0.277*** 2.894*** 1.244***
(0.068) (0.110) (0.075) (0.089) (0.156) (0.261)
PST Labor 0.053*** 0.142*** 0.635***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.085)
Constant 0.349 0.113 0.603 -0.102 -2.232 -3.878
(0.520) (0.509) (0.522) (0.392) (3.181) (2.889)
AdjR2 0.334 0.370 0.267 0.595 0.577 0.653
*signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level, ** 0.05, ***0.01.
N = 254, standard errors in parentheses
36Table IX: Regression Results: Poisson
Medical Imaging Neural Networks Signal Processing
Patents Patents Patents Patents Patents Patents
Papers 0.083*** 0.002 0.063*** -0.006** 0.031*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.0002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(PSTLabor ) 1.025*** 1.082*** 0.987***
(0.046) (0.039) (0.017)
Constant 0.159*** -2.369*** 0.421*** -2.505*** 2.156*** -0.322***
(0.056) (0.161) (0.050) (0.154) (0.020) (0.059)
PseudoR2 0.359 0.558 0.248 0.594 0.547 0.762
*signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level, ** 0.05, ***0.01.
N = 254, standard errors in parentheses
37Table X: Regression Results: Negative Binomial
Medical Imaging Neural Networks Signal Processing
Patents Patents Patents
Papers -0.007 0.041 0.019***
(0.030) (0.037) (0.007)
ln(PSTLabor ) 1.661*** 0.826*** 0.952***
(0.217) (0.130) (0.079)
Constant -4.378*** -1.964*** -0.587***
(0.547) (0.278) (0.174)
ln(Alpha) 1.312*** 1.408*** 0.688***
(0.185) (0.188) (0.125)
PseudoR2 0.205 0.122 0.150
*signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level, ** 0.05, ***0.01.
N = 254, Standard errors in parentheses
38Table XI: Regression Results: ZIP
Medical Imaging Neural Networks Signal Processing
Patents Patents Patents
Papers 0.022*** -0.004 0.006***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
ln(PSTLabor ) 0.386*** 0.789*** 0.828***
(0.055) (0.050) (0.018)
Constant 0.469** -0.893*** 0.343***
(0.199) (0.198) (0.065)
INFLATE
No IEEE Papers 1.074** 0.951** 1.370***
(0.511) (0.449) (0.443)
EE Share of Total Patents -3.929*** -3.357*** -4.467***
(1.248) (1.074) (1.121)
Ln(Population) -2.003*** -1.125*** -1.245***
(0.345) (0.257) (0.254)
Constant 28.531*** 15.984*** 15.441***
(4.849) (3.599) (3.315)
Prob >c h i 2 0.000 0.000 0.000
*signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level, ** 0.05, ***0.01.
N = 254, Standard errors in parentheses
39Table XII: Regression Results: OLS (including test for anchor)
Medical Imaging Neural Networks Signal Processing
Patents Patents Patents Patents Patents Patents Patents Patents Patents
excl. excl. excl. excl. excl. excl. excl. excl. excl.
anchors anchors anchors anchors anchors anchors anchors anchors anchors
(WLS) (WLS) (WLS)
Papers 0.405*** 0.424*** 0.182*** -0.151* -0.125* 0.024 1.148*** 1.031*** 0.449***
(0.100) (0.096) (0.066) (0.077) (0.073) (0.060) (0.214) (0.211) (0.133)
Anchor -1.393 -2.082 5.154*** 5.159*** 14.649 6.764
(3.885) (2.999) (1.892) (1.833) (13.581) (11.142)
Anch*Pap 0.750*** 0.828*** 0.304*** 0.353*** 1.841** 2.318***
(0.202) (0.213) (0.102) (0.125) (0.715) (0.716)
PST Labor 0.053*** 0.024* 0.057*** 0.105*** 0.070*** 0.051*** 0.470*** 0.334*** 0.483***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.069) (0.077) (0.067)
Constant -0.154 0.096 -0.165 -0.057 0.100 0.148 -3.188 -2.058 -1.076
(0.463) (0.450) (0.234) (0.337) (0.327) (0.198) (2.370) (2.370) (1.197)
AdjR
2 0.406 0.454 0.390 0.542 0.591 0.408 0.647 0.665 0.584
*signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level, ** 0.05, ***0.01.
N = 254, standard errors in parentheses
40Table XIII: Regression Results: ZIP (including test for anchor)
Medical Imaging Neural Networks Signal Processing
Patents Patents Patents Patents Patents Patents
excl. excl. excl. excl. excl. excl.
anchors anchors anchors anchors anchors anchors
Papers 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.001 0.006** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Anchor 0.441*** 0.953*** 0.482***
(0.103) (0.119) (0.043)
ln(PSTLabor ) 0.604*** 0.548*** 0.702*** 0.446*** 0.801*** 0.737***
(0.066) (0.068) (0.055) (0.060) (0.020) (0.021)
Constant -0.614** -0.464* -0.812*** -0.215 0.214*** 0.349***
(0.254) (0.254) (0.217) (0.213) (0.072) (0.073)
INFLATE
No IEEE Papers 1.000* 1.015** 0.939** 0.963** 1.378*** 1.379***
(0.529) (0.528) (0.454) (0.447) (0.454) (0.449)
EE Share of Total Patents -4.084*** -4.090*** -3.398*** -3.446*** -4.566*** -4.481***
(1.365) (1.363) (1.093) (1.084) (1.158) (1.133)
Ln(Population) -1.893*** -1.915*** -1.135*** -1.244*** -1.213*** -1.244***
(0.357) (0.357) (0.258) (0.255) (0.257) (0.255)
Constant 26.975*** 27.283*** 16.123*** 17.640*** 15.008*** 15.405***
(5.037) (5.038) (3.627) (3.572) (3.358) (3.333)
Prob >c h i 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level, ** 0.05, ***0.01.































































Figure 3: Signal Processing
44